Length-based attacks in polycyclic groups by Kahrobaei, Delaram et al.
This is a repository copy of Length-based attacks in polycyclic groups.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/144171/
Article:
Kahrobaei, Delaram orcid.org/0000-0001-5467-7832, Garber, David and Lam, Ha (2015) 
Length-based attacks in polycyclic groups. Groups Complexity Cryptology. pp. 33-43. 
ISSN 1869-6104 
https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2014-0003
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
DOI 10.1515/jmc-2014-0003 | J. Math. Cryptol. 2015; 9 (1):33–43
Research Article
David Garber, Delaram Kahrobaei and Ha T. Lam
Length-based attacks in polycyclic groups
Abstract: The Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was implemented and studied with
the braid groups as its underlying platform. The length-based attack, introduced by Hughes and Tannen-
baum, has been used to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol in this setting. Eick and Kahrobaei suggest to use the
polycyclic groups as a possible platform for the AAG protocol. In this paper, we apply several known variants
of the length-based attack against the AAG protocol with the polycyclic group as the underlying platform.
The experimental results show that, in these groups, the implemented variants of the length-based attack are
unsuccessful in the case of polycyclic groups having high Hirsch length. This suggests that the length-based
attack is insucient to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol when implemented over this type of polycyclic groups.
This implies that polycyclic groups could be a potential platform for some cryptosystems based on conjugacy
search problem, such as non-commutative Die–Hellman, El Gamal and Cramer–Shoup key-exchange pro-
tocols. Moreover, we compare for the rst time the success rates of the dierent variants of the length-based
attack. These experiments show that, in these groups, thememory length-based attack introduced by Garber,
Kaplan, Teicher, Tsaban and Vishne does better than the other variants proposed thus far in this context.
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1 Introduction
The Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was introduced in 1999 [1]. Following its intro-
duction, the AAG protocol was extensively studied using dierent groups as its underlying platform. Ko et al.
[15] used braid groups. Moreover, Myasnikov and Ushakov [18] studied the security of the AAG protocol with
respect to several attacks on any platform groups satisfying some theoretic properties (exponentially generic
free basis property).
Hughes and Tannenbaum [11] introduced the length-based attack (LBA) on the AAG protocol with its
implementation in braid groups. They emphasized the importance of choosing the correct length function.
Later, Garber et al. [6] gave several realizations of this approach, particularly a length function for the braid
group and experimental results suggesting that the attack fails for the parameters suggested in existing pro-
tocols. However, Garber et al. [5] also suggested an extension of the length-based attack which uses memory
which succeeded in cryptanalyzing the AAG protocol. A similar attack was implemented against a system
based on the Thompson group [19]. Most recently, Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] analyzed the reasons behind
the failure of the previous implementations of the LBA, such as the occurrence of commutator-type peaks,
and gave an experimental evidence that the LBA can be modied to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol with high
success rate. However, this work is again done the braid groups as the underlying platform.
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Eick and Kahrobaei [3] have suggested a dierent platform for the AAG protocol – the polycyclic group.
In polycyclic groups, the word problem can be solved eciently [7], but known solutions to the conjugacy
problem are much less ecient. Using experimental results, Eick and Kahrobaei showed that while the con-
jugacy problem can be solvedwithin seconds using polycyclic groupswith small Hirsch length, the conjugacy
problem in polycyclic groups with high Hirsch length requires a much longer time for its solution.
Taking inspiration from this result, we investigate the success rate of the length-based attack on the AAG
protocol, where the underlying platform is the polycyclic groups, especially those with high Hirsch length.
Toward this end, we rst construct polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length using a method introduced by
Holt et al. [10]. Then, we implement the dierent variants of the LBA presented in [5, 6, 17]. The experimental
results that we collect suggest that the LBA is insucient to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol, when we use the
polycyclic groups with high enough Hirsch length as the underlying platform. Consequently, the polycyclic
group is the rst underlying platformwhich the LBA is insucient for cryptanalyzing theAAGprotocol on this
platform, whereas the solution for the word problem is quite ecient. A suggestion for concrete parameters
appears in the last section.
Moreover, we compare for the rst time on any platform the success rates of the dierent variants of the
LBA.
As a wider application, we note that the conjugacy search problem is the basis for various cryptographic
protocols besides AAG, such as the non-commutative Die–Hellman key-exchange [15], the non-commu-
tative ElGamal key-exchange [12], thenon-abelianCramer–Shoupkey-exchange [2] and thenon-commutative
digital signatures [13]. The LBA can be applied to all these protocols; therefore, a platform group which ex-
perimental results show that the LBA is insucient for cryptanalyzing the AAG protocol over this platform,
such as polycyclic groups, can help instantiate them.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key-exchange
protocol. In Section 3, we give a short review of polycyclic groups and the construction that we have used. In
Section 4, we review the length-based attack, and in Section 5, we present the experiments, their results and
corresponding conclusions.
2 The Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key-exchange protocol
Following [17], we present here theAnshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key-exchange protocol (formore details, see [1]).
As usual, we use two entities, called Alice and Bob, for presenting the two parties which plan to communicate
over an insecure channel.
Let 퐺 be a group with generators 푔1, . . . , 푔푛. First, Alice chooses her public set 푎 = (푎1, . . . , 푎푁1 ), where
푎푖 ∈ 퐺, and Bob chooses his public set 푏 = (푏1, . . . , 푏푁2 ), where 푏푖 ∈ 퐺. They both publish their sets. Alice
then chooses her private key 퐴 = 푎휀1푠1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푎
휀퐿
푠퐿 , where 푎푠푖 ∈ 푎 and 휀푖 ∈ {±1}. Bob also chooses his private key
퐵 = 푏훿1푡1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푏
훿퐿
푡퐿 , where 푏푡푖 ∈ 푏 and 훿푖 ∈ {±1}. Alice computes 푏
耠
푖 = 퐴−1푏푖퐴 for all 푏푖 ∈ 푏 and sends it to Bob. Bob
also computes 푎耠푖 = 퐵−1푎푖퐵 for all 푎푖 ∈ 푎 and sends it to Alice. Now, the shared secret key is 퐾 = 퐴−1퐵−1퐴퐵.
Alice computes this key by
퐾퐴 = 퐴−1(푎耠휀1푠1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푎
耠휀퐿
푠퐿 )
= 퐴−1(퐵−1푎푠1퐵)
휀1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ (퐵−1푎푠퐿퐵)
휀퐿
= 퐴−1퐵−1(푎휀1푠1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푎
휀퐿
푠퐿 )퐵
= 퐴−1퐵−1퐴퐵 = 퐾.
Similarly, Bob can compute 퐾퐵 = 퐵−1(푏
耠훿1
푡1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푏
耠훿퐿
푡퐿 ) = 퐵
−1퐴−1퐵퐴, and then he knows the shared secret key by
퐾 = 퐾−1퐵 .
In order to nd퐾, it is enough for the eavesdropper either to nd퐴耠 ∈ ⟨푎1, . . . , 푎푁1⟩ such that 푏耠 = 퐴
耠−1푏퐴耠
or to nd 퐵耠 ∈ ⟨푏1, . . . , 푏푁2⟩ such that 푎耠 = 퐵
耠−1푎퐵耠 (an incompatible sucient condition can be found in [14]).
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Thus, the security of the AAG protocol is based on the assumption that the subgroup-restricted simultaneous
conjugacy search problem is hard.
3 Polycyclic groups
In this section, we give a short review for polycyclic groups and describe the construction of polycyclic groups
of high Hirsch length. For more details, see [10].
3.1 The polycyclic presentation
Recall that 퐺 is a polycyclic group if it has a polycyclic series, i.e., a subnormal series
퐺 = 퐺1 ⊲ 퐺2 ⊲ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊲ 퐺푛+1 = {1},
with non-trivial cyclic factors. The polycyclic generating sequence of 퐺 is the 푛-tuple (푔1, . . . , 푔푛), such that
퐺푖 = ⟨푔푖, 퐺푖+1⟩ for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛.
Any polycyclic group has a nite presentation of the form
⟨푔1, . . . , 푔푛 | 푔
푔푖
푗 = 푤푖푗, 푔
푔−1
푖
푗 = 푣푖푗, 푔
푟푘
푘 = 푢푘푘 for 1 ≤ 푖 < 푗 ≤ 푛 and 푘 ∈ 퐼⟩,
where 푤푖푗, 푣푖푗, 푢푘푘 are words in the generators 푔푖+1, . . . , 푔푛 and 퐼 is the set of indices 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , 푛} such that
푟푖 = [퐺푖 : 퐺푖+1] is nite. Here 푎푏 stands for 푏−1푎푏.
It is known by induction that each element of 퐺 dened by this presentation can be uniquely written as
푔 = 푔푒11 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푔푒푛푛 where 푒푖 ∈ ℤ for 1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛, and 0 ≤ 푒푖 < 푟푖 for 푖 ∈ 퐼. We call 푔 = 푔
푒1
1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 푔푒푛푛 the normal form of an
element in퐺. If every element in the group can be uniquely presented in the normal form, then the polycyclic
presentation is called consistent. Note that every polycyclic group has a consistent polycyclic presentation
(see [10]).
The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group is the number of indices 푖 such that 푟푖 = [퐺푖 : 퐺푖+1] is innite. This
number is invariant of the chosen polycyclic sequence.
3.2 Constructing polycyclic groups using number elds
There are several ways for constructing polycyclic groups. For the purpose of this paper, we construct poly-
cyclic groups by semidirect products of the maximal order and the unit group of a number eld. This con-
struction follows [10].
Let 푓(푥) ∈ ℤ[푥] be an irreducible polynomial. The polynomial 푓 denes a eld extension 퐹 over ℚ. The
maximal order or the ring of integers 푂퐹 of the number eld 퐹 is the set of algebraic integers in 퐹,
푂퐹 = {푎 ∈ 퐹 | there exists a monic polynomial 푓푎(푥) ∈ ℤ[푥] such that 푓푎(푎) = 0}.
The unit group of 퐹 is
푈퐹 = {푎 ∈ 푂퐹 | 푎 ̸= 0 and 푎−1 ∈ 푂퐹}.
For constructing the polycyclic group by themaximal order and the unit group of a number eld 퐹where
[퐹 : ℚ] = 푛, we recall two results. First, themaximal order푂퐹 forms a ringwhose additive group is isomorphic
to ℤ푛 (see [20]). Second, Dirichlet’s unit theorem states that given 푛 = 푠 + 2푡, where 푠 and 2푡 are the numbers
of real eld monomorphisms 퐹 → ℝ and complex eld monomorphisms 퐹 → ℂ respectively, then the unit
group 푈퐹 is a nitely-generated abelian group of the form 푈퐹 ≅ ℤ푠+푡−1 × ℤ푚 for some even푚 (see [20]). Here,
we use the fact that the unit group is a nitely-generated abelian group and hence 푈퐹 is also polycyclic.
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Let 퐺 be a group and푁 E 퐺, it is easy to see that if푁 and 퐺/푁 are both polycyclic, then the group 퐺 is
also polycyclic by putting together the polycyclic series of푁 and the series induced by the polycyclic series
of 퐺/푁. Since the above results guaranteed that the maximal order is a polycyclic group and the unit group,
which is isomorphic to퐺/푂퐹, is also polycyclic, the group퐺 = 푂퐹 ⋊ 푈퐹 is polycyclic. The actionwhich denes
the semidirect product is a multiplication from the right of 푈퐹 on 푂퐹.
If푁 E 퐺, the Hirsch length of a polycyclic group 퐺 is ℎ(퐺) = ℎ(푁) + ℎ(퐺/푁); in our case,
ℎ(퐺) = ℎ(푂퐹) + ℎ(푈퐹),
where ℎ(푂퐹) is 푛, which is the degree of the generating polynomial 푓. Hence, for constructing a polycyclic
group of high Hirsch length, we have to nd an irreducible polynomial of high enough degree, and then
the polycyclic group constructed by the above method will have Hirsch length larger than the degree of the
polynomial.
3.3 Polycyclic groups as platform groups for the AAG protocol
Polycyclic groups are suitable as platform groups for the AAG protocol for several reasons. First, the word
problem can be solved eciently using the collection algorithm [7], see also [3]. Second, the conjugacy search
problem has no ecient solution in general polycyclic groups. This assessment is due to Eick and Kahro-
baei [3], using the following experiment: Let 퐾 = ℚ[푥]/(푓푤) be an algebraic number eld for a cyclotomic
polynomial 푓푤, where 푤 is a primitive 푟-th root of unity. Let 퐺(푤) = 푂 ⋊ 푈, where 푂 is the maximal order
and 푈 the unit group of 퐾, 푟 the order of 푤 and ℎ(퐺(푤)) the Hirsch length. The average time used for 100
applications of the collection algorithm on random words and the average time used for 100 applications of
the conjugacy algorithm on random conjugates is
푟 ℎ(퐺(푤)) Collection Conjugation
3 2 0.00 seconds 9.96 seconds
4 2 0.00 seconds 9.37 seconds
7 6 0.01 seconds 10.16 seconds
11 14 0.05 seconds > 100 hours
We can see that the collection algorithmworks very fast even for polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length,
and therefore the word problem has an ecient solution. On the other hand, the solution to the conjugacy
problem is not ecient for polycyclic groups having high Hirsch length.
4 The length-based attack
The length-based attack (LBA) is a probabilistic attack against the conjugacy search problem in general, and
against the AAG protocol in particular, with the goal of nding Alice’s (or Bob’s) private key. It is based on
the idea that a conjugation of the correct element should decrease the length of the captured package. Using
the notations of Section 2, the captured package is 푏耠 = (푏耠1, . . . , 푏耠푁2 ), where 푏
耠
푖 = 퐴−1푏푖퐴. If we conjugate 푏耠
with elements from the group ⟨푎1, . . . , 푎푁1⟩ and the length of the resulting tuple has been decreased, then
we have found a candidate for the conjugating factor. The process of conjugation is then repeated with the
decreased-length tuple until a longer candidate for the conjugating factor is found. The process ends when
the conjugated captured package is the same as 푏 = (푏1, . . . , 푏푁2 ), which is known. Then, the conjugate can be
recovered by reversing the sequence of conjugating factors. For more details on the LBA, see [5, 6, 9, 16, 17].
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4.1 Variants of the LBA
In [5, 6, 17, 19], several variants of the LBA are presented. Here, we give four variants of the LBA that we
implemented against the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform. In all these
variants, the following input and output are expected:
∙ Input: 푎 = (푎1, . . . , 푎푁1 ), 푏 = (푏1, . . . , 푏푁2 ) and 푏耠 = (푏
耠
1, . . . , 푏耠푁2 ), such that 푏
耠
푖 = 푏퐴푖 for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁2.
∙ Output: An element 퐴耠 ∈ ⟨푎1, . . . , 푎푁1⟩ such that 푏
耠
푖 = 푏퐴
耠
푖 for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁2, or FAIL if the algorithm cannot
nd such 퐴耠.
We will use the following notation: if 푐 = (푐1, . . . , 푐푘), then its total length |푐| is∑푘푖=1 |푐푖| (the length of 푐푖, |푐푖|,
will be discussed in Section 4.2).
4.1.1 LBA with backtracking
Themost straight-forward variant of LBA (see Algorithm 1) conjugates 푏耠 directly with 푎±1푖 ∈ {푎1, . . . , 푎푁1 }. This
is termed “LBA with backtracking” by Myasnikov and Ushakov [17].
4.1.2 LBA with a dynamic set
Through analysis, Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] concluded that dierent types of peaks make LBA unsuccess-
ful. To overcome this, they suggested a new version of the algorithm, which they termed “LBAwith a dynamic
set”. Here (see Algorithm 2), if a generator 푎푖 causes a length reduction, only the conjugates and products in-
volving 푎푖 are added to the dynamic set. On the other hand, if no generator causes a length reduction, all
conjugates and two generators products are added. Their experimental results suggest that this algorithm
works especially well in the case of keys composed from long generators, but it is not worse than the naive
algorithm in the other cases. The algorithm presented here is a modied version of their algorithm, which we
implemented to attack the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform.
4.1.3 Memory-LBA
Another variant, presented in [5], is also considered. In this variant (see Algorithm 3), we allocate an array 푆
of a xed size푀. The array 푆 holds푀 tuples every round. In every round, all elements of 푆 are conjugated, but
only the푀 smallest conjugated tuples (with respect to their length) are inserted back into 푆. For the halting
condition, we use a predened time-out.
4.1.4 LBA* (with memory)
We present a dierent variant of memory-LBA which is again based on a xed-size array allocated for the
algorithm. Here (see Algorithm 4), 푆 holds 푀 tuples every round and is sorted by the rst element (with
respect to the length of conjugated element) of each tuple. In every round, only the smallest element of 푆 is
removed and conjugated by all the generators and their inverses. The conjugated tuples are inserted back into
푆 depending on whether there is a free place in 푆. If there is no more places in 푆, and the conjugated tuple is
smaller than the largest element in 푆, swap them and re-sort 푆. Since 푆 is always kept sorted, any operation
to nd the “smallest element” costs constant time. As in the previous variant, we use a predened time-out
as the halting condition.
Authenticated | dkahrobaei@gc.cuny.edu author's copy
Download Date | 3/27/19 11:46 AM
38 | D. Garber, D. Kahrobaei and H. T. Lam, Length-based attacks in polycyclic groups
Algorithm 1. LBA with backtracking
1: Initialize 푆 = {(푏耠, idG)}.
2: while 푆 ̸= 0 do
3: Choose (푐, 푥) ∈ 푆 such that |푐| is minimal. Remove (푐, 푥).
4: for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁1 and 휀 = ±1 do
5: Compute 훿푖,휀 = |푐| − |푐푎
휀
푖 |.
6: if 푐푎
휀
푖 = 푏 then output inverse of 푥푎휀푖 and stop.
7: if 훿푖,휀 > 0 then ⊳ length has been decreased
8: Add (푐푎
휀
푖 , 푥푎휀푖 ) to 푆.
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL. ⊳ no more elements to conjugate
Algorithm 2. LBA with a dynamic set
1: Initialize 푆 = {(푏耠, idG)}.
2: while 푆 ̸= 0 do
3: Choose (푐, 푥) ∈ 푆 such that |푐| is minimal. Remove (푐, 푥).
4: for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁1 and 휀 = ±1 do
5: Compute 훿푖,휀 = |푐| − |푐푎
휀
푖 |
6: end for
7: if 훿푖,휀 ≤ 0 for all 푖 then
8: Dene 푎ext = 푎 ∪ {푥푖푥푗푥−1푖 , 푥푖푥푗, 푥2푖 | 푥푖, 푥푗 ∈ 푎±1, 푖 ̸= 푗}.
9: else Dene 푎ext = 푎 ∪ {푥푗푥푚푥−1푗 , 푥푚푥푗, 푥푗푥푚, 푥2푚 | 푥푗 ∈ 푎±1, 푚 ̸= 푗}
10: where 푥푚 is such that 훿푚 = max{훿푖,휀 | 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁1}.
11: end if
12: for all 푤 ∈ 푎ext do
13: Compute 훿푤 = |푐| − |푐푤|.
14: end for
15: if 푐푤 = 푏 then output inverse of 푥푤 and stop.
16: if 훿푤 > 0 then ⊳ length has been decreased
17: Add (푐푤, 푥푤) to 푆.
18: end if
19: end while
20: Otherwise, output FAIL. ⊳ no more elements to conjugate
Algorithm 3.Memory-LBA
1: Initialize 푆 = {(|푏耠|, 푏耠, idG)}.
2: while not time-out do
3: for (|푐|, 푐, 푥) ∈ 푆 do
4: Remove (|푐|, 푐, 푥) from 푆.
5: Compute 푐푎
휀
푖 for all 푖 ∈ {1 . . . 푁1} and 휀 ∈ {±1}.
6: if 푐푎
휀
푖 = 푏 then output inverse of 푥푎휀푖 and stop.
7: Save (|푐푎
휀
푖 |, 푐푎
휀
푖 , 푥푎휀푖 ) in 푆耠.
8: end for
9: After nished all conjugations, sort 푆耠 by the rst element of every tuple.
10: Copy the smallest푀 elements into 푆 and delete the rest of 푆耠.
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL.
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Algorithm 4. LBA* (with memory)
1: Initialize 푆 = {(|푏耠|, 푏耠, idG)}.
2: while not time-out do
3: Choose (|푐|, 푐, 푥) ∈ 푆 such that |푐| is minimal. Remove (|푐|, 푐, 푥).
4: for 푖 = 1, . . . , 푁1 and 휀 = ±1 do
5: Compute 푐푎
휀
푖 .
6: if 푐푎
휀
푖 = 푏 then output inverse of 푥푎휀푖 and stop.
7: if Size(푆) < 푀 then
8: Add (儨儨儨儨儨푐
푎휀
푖
儨儨儨儨儨 , 푐
푎휀
푖 , 푥푎휀푖 ) to 푆 and sort 푆 by rst element of every tuple.
9: else ⊳ no more space in S
10: if
儨儨儨儨儨푐
푎휀
푖
儨儨儨儨儨 is smaller than rst element of all tuples in S then swap them
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
14: Otherwise, output FAIL. ⊳ no more elements to conjugate
The name LBA* comes from the general idea of A* search algorithm [8], which uses a best-rst search (as
we are doing here – taking the smallest element of 푆 and conjugated it). We should note that a very similar
algorithm was independently introduced by Tsaban [21], and the dierence between the two variants is that
our variant starts the search from 푏耠, while Tsaban’s variant starts the search from both directions: 푏耠 and 푏耠
(using the idea of “meet in the middle”).
4.2 The length function
In the implementation of the LBA, the choice of the length function is important (see [5, 9]). In our case,
the length of a word is chosen to be the sum of the absolute values of the exponents in its normal form. We
choose this function because the experimental results presented below show that it satises the requirement
ℓ(푎−1푏푎) ≫ ℓ(푏) (as needed for a length function used for LBA).
The rst step of the experiments is the construction of a polycyclic group 퐺 of a given Hirsch length
ℎ(퐺), following the construction in Sections 3.2 and 5.1. Then, an element 푏 of length between 10 and 13
is randomly chosen; we choose elements of this length for consistency with the LBA parameters. Another
random element 푎 satisfying the same length interval is chosen and 푏푎 is computed, and nally, we compute
|푏푎| − |푏|. We performed 100 tests for each group and the average dierence is recorded.
Polynomial ℎ(퐺) Average dierence
푥2 − 푥 − 1 3 79.92
푥5 − 푥3 − 1 7 80.17
푥11 − 푥3 − 1 16 44.93
As we can see, the average dierence is large; specically |푏푎| − |푏| is signicantly larger than |푎|, indicat-
ing that the condition ℓ(푎−1푏푎) ≫ ℓ(푏) is indeed satised.
5 Experimental results
Our goal is to apply the LBA on the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform. To
that end, we implemented the four variants of the LBA presented in Section 4 and performed experiments on
several polycyclic groups having dierent Hirsch lengths.
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5.1 Implementation details
Each polycyclic group is constructed by choosing an irreducible polynomial 푓 overℤ, thus 푓 denes an alge-
braic eld퐹 overℚ. Let푂퐹 be itsmaximal order and푈퐹 be its unit group, thus푂퐹 ⋊ 푈퐹 is the desiredpolycyclic
group. This construction follows [10] and is a part of the Polycyclic package of GAP (see [4]).
A random element 푎푖, for Alice’s public set, or 푏푖, for Bob’s public set, is generated by taking either some
random generators of the group or their inverses and multiplying them together, while maintaining that the
length of the element is between a predenedminimum andmaximum. By this method, we take control over
the length of the element.
Alice’s private key 퐴 is generated by taking a xed number of random elements in 푎 = (푎1, . . . , 푎푁1 ) and
multiplying them together. Here we forgo control over length to preserve interesting cases of conjugations
actually decreasing the length of 푏푖, such as a commutator-type peak. Theway for choosing the keys is similar
to what has been used in [17]. This way also reects the characterization of the polycyclic group.
5.2 Results
We performed several sets of tests, all of which were run on an Intel Core I7 quad-core 2.0GHz computer
with 12GB of RAM, running Ubuntu Version 12.04 with GAP Version 4.5 and 10GB of memory allocation. In
all these tests, the polycyclic group 퐺 having Hirsch length ℎ(퐺) is constructed by the above method using
polynomial 푓. The sizes of Alice’s and Bob’s public sets are both푁1 = 푁2 = 20.
5.2.1 The eect of the Hirsch length
In the rst set of tests, the length of each randomelement 푎푖 or 푏푖 is in the interval [퐿1, 퐿2] = [10, 13] andAlice’s
private key is the product of 퐿 = 5 random elements in Alice’s public set. The time for each batch of 100 tests
is recorded together with its success rate. In each case, a time-out of 60minutes is enforced for each test. The
following results are obtained by LBA with a dynamic set
Polynomial ℎ(퐺) Time Success rate of
LBA with a dynamic set
푥2 − 푥 − 1 3 0.20 hours 100%
푥5 − 푥3 − 1 7 76.87 hours 35%
푥7 − 푥3 − 1 10 94.43 hours 8%
푥9 − 7푥3 − 1 14 95.18 hours 5%
푥11 − 푥3 − 1 16 95.05 hours 5%
From this table, we can see that with a small Hirsch length, the LBA cryptanalyzes the AAG protocol
easily with high success rate. However, as the Hirsch length is increased to 7, the success rate decreases. In
polycyclic groups with higher Hirsch lengths, we can see the eect of the time-out more prominently as the
total time did not increasemuchmore, but the success rate is dropped to 5%. Although a success rate of 5% is
not negligible, note that we use a very small value for 퐿. Based on the current experimental results, we expect
that increasing the value of 퐿 will reduce the success rate to 0%.
5.2.2 The eect of the key length
In the second set of tests, we vary the number of elements 퐿 that compose Alice’s private key. Myasnikov
and Ushakov [17] suggested that the LBA with a dynamic set has a high success rate with long generators,
i.e. random elements have longer length [퐿1, 퐿2]. Therefore, we also vary the length of random elements
according to the parameters in [17].
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The following results are obtained by LBA with a dynamic set, with a time-out of 30minutes:
Polynomial ℎ(퐺) [10, 13] [20, 23] [40, 43]
퐿 = 10 퐿 = 10 퐿 = 20 퐿 = 50
푥7 − 푥3 − 1 10 2% 0% 0% 0%
푥9 − 7푥3 − 1 14 0% 0% 0% 0%
푥11 − 3푥3 − 1 17 0% 0% 0% 0%
The results of this set of tests indicate that just by increasing the number of generators of Alice’s private
key from 5 (as in the previous set of tests) to 10, the LBA already fails with polycyclic groups having Hirsch
length as small as 10.
5.2.3 Comparing the four variants of the LBA
In this paper, we compare the success rates of the four variants of the LBA for the rst time on any platform.
For comparing the success rates of the four variants of the LBA, we purposely choose the value of the test
parameters to be very small in this set of tests. They are as follows:푁1 = 푁2 = 20, [퐿1, 퐿2] = [5, 8], 퐿 = 5, there
is a time-out of 30minutes and amemory of size푀 = 500. The polynomial used is푓 = 푥3 − 푥 − 1, constructing
a polycyclic group of Hirsch length 4.
Algorithm Time Success rate
LBA with backtracking 0.57 hours 58%
LBA with a dynamic set 37.35 hours 95%
Memory-LBA (with memory푀 = 500) 4.01 hours 92%
LBA* (with memory푀 = 500) 32.00 hours 36%
Algorithm LBA with a dynamic set gives the best success rate but took much longer than Algorithm
Memory-LBA which gives a similar success rate in much shorter time. We conclude that with a sucient size
of memory, Algorithm Memory-LBA is the best variant of the LBA.
5.2.4 Using the four variants of the LBA on our test parameters
In the fourth set of tests, we want to see the eect of the four dierent variants of the LBA presented in Sec-
tion 4.1 applied to our test parameters. Therefore, we keep the following parameters for all the algorithms:
the length of each random element is in the interval [퐿1, 퐿2] = [10, 13], Alice’s private key is the product of 10
elements and the length of both public sets are푁1 = 푁2 = 20. There is a time-out of 30minutes per test and
in the case of the twomemory variants of the LBA, AlgorithmMemory-LBA and Algorithm LBA*, a memory of
size푀 = 1000 is used. The same polycyclic group 퐺 having Hirsch length 14 constructed by the polynomial
푥9 − 7푥3 − 1 is used for all the variants of the LBA.
Algorithm Time Success rate
LBA with backtracking 48.68 hours 0%
LBA with a dynamic set 50.04 hours 0%
Memory-LBA (with memory푀 = 1000) 49.35 hours 3%
LBA* (with memory푀 = 1000) 50.00 hours 0%
As we can see, Memory-LBA algorithm has the best performance in this set of parameters, but even then,
it has only 3% success rate. To further test Memory-LBA algorithm, we run another set of tests where we
increase the length of random elements to [퐿1, 퐿2] = [20, 23] and increase the number of factors of the private
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key to 퐿 = 20. To give it a chance of success, we increase the size of the memory푀 to 40,000. The result is 0%
success rate.
5.2.5 The eect of increasing the time-out
Since it is possible that the time-out of 30minutes for each test is too short, we run another set of tests, where
the time-out is 4 hours for each test. Memory-LBA algorithm showed the most promise, so we chose it with
the following parameters: the length of random elements is in the interval [퐿1, 퐿2] = [20, 23], the number of
factors of the private key is 퐿 = 20 and the size of the memory푀 is 1000. The polynomial used is 푥9 − 7푥3 − 1
producing a polycyclic group of Hirsch length 14. Due to the long time-out, we performed only 50 tests. We
still get 0% success rate.
Based on the above experimental results, we conclude that the LBA is insucient for cryptanalyzing the
polycyclic groups of high enoughHirsch lengths. One can suggest the following parameters: ℎ(퐺) = 16, 퐿 = 20
and [퐿1, 퐿2] = [20, 23] for achieving anAAGprotocol based on the polycyclic group,which the knownvariants
of the LBA have 0% success rate for cryptanalyzing this protocol.
5.2.6 Additional experimental results concerning LBA with a dynamic set algorithm
Here, we present some additional experimental results for LBAwith a dynamic set. The time-out for each test
is 1 hour. The polynomials used are 푓 and ℎ(퐺) is the Hirsch length of the corresponding polycyclic group.
The sizes of Alice’s and Bob’s public sets are푁1, 푁2 respectively. Each random element 푎푖 or 푏푖 has length in
[퐿1, 퐿2] and Alice’s private key is the product of 퐿 = 5 random elements in Alice’s public set. The success rate
of a batch of 100 tests is recorded.
Polynomial ℎ(퐺) 푁1 = 푁2 = 5 푁1 = 푁2 = 20
[5, 8] [15, 18] [10, 13]
푥 − 1 1 98% 98%
푥2 − 푥 − 1 3 98% 96% 100%
푥3 − 푥 − 1 4 95% 100%
푥5 − 푥3 − 1 7 35%
푥7 − 푥3 − 1 10 8%
푥9 − 7푥3 − 1 14 5%
푥11 − 푥3 − 1 16 59% 53% 5%
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